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ABSTRACT  
Recent socio-political events - such as Brexit - have provoked discussion and 
uncertainties about the future of the European Union, including European sustainable 
energy transitions. Nevertheless, not much research in the energy and social science 
domain has discussed and empirically explored how these socio-political events and 
related processes - rise in right-wing populism, post-truth politics - are shaped by and 
impact public beliefs about energy issues and the role of changes in people's different-
level identities (local, national, European). In this paper, we discuss the importance of 
further exploring these ideas in energy social science research. We examine results of 
the Eurobarometer survey in the time span 2007-2016, and of two different 
representative surveys of United Kingdom adults, conducted in 2007 and 2012. This 
data allowed us to explore similarities and differences during this period regarding 
attitudes and beliefs about high voltage power lines and other energy and climate 
change related issues at different levels, and associated identities. Results suggest that 
feelings of belonging to different imaginary communities play out socio-political and 
psychological intergroup relations. We conclude that the ways that these impact on 
people's responses regarding energy issues at local, national and European levels 
represent promising directions for future research.  
 
KEYWORDS: social/place identities; multi-scalar approach; beliefs about renewable 
energy generation and associated infrastructures; Brexit 
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1. The European Union, right-wing populism and the energy transition: The 
importance of a socio-psychological approach 
In recent years, governments worldwide and specifically within the European 
Union have been fostering the deployment of renewable energy generation and 
associated technologies, such as high voltage power lines (RET). These technologies 
have pan-European relevance to tackle climate change and guarantee security of 
supply (Sataoen et al., 2015). As put forward by the European Commission itself 
(2015), the ‘Energy Union’ aims to integrate state energy systems and institutions 
while envisaging to reduce bills, increase renewable energy deployment and reduce 
the likelihood of blackouts (Kanham et al., 2017). This has been mainly promoted by 
regulatory and normative frameworks - such as the Renewables Directive 2009 - that 
are legally binding, enforcing specific renewable energy generation targets to be 
achieved within a specific timeframe. These legal changes come in tandem with 
socio-technical changes (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2015). So far these have mainly 
materialized as large-scale energy infrastructures at three different levels. First, within 
national contexts, with renewable energy generation infrastructures (and associated 
power lines) being constructed in specific locales (Bridge et al., 2013). Second, in 
trans-boundary infrastructures projects, notably grid interconnectors (Ciupuliga & 
Cuppen, 2013; Battaligni et al., 2012). Third, in infrastructures built locally/nationally 
but with European relevance – such as large-scale storage, as suggested by the idea of 
Norway being the green battery of Europe (Gurzu, 2016). In turn, these initiatives 
seem to depart from the assumption of the cooperation between groups, be it between 
local/national communities and European level institutions, or between European 
nation-states.  
However, the deployment of large-scale RET at a local level is often 
contested, as much research within the Energy Research and Social Science field 
testifies to (e.g., Walker, 1995; Wolsink, 2000; Devine-Wright, 2005; Burningham, 
Barnett & Walker, 2015). Additionally, recent socio-political events also question that 
assumption. ‘Brexit’, meaning the United Kingdom (UK) announcing in 2016 its 
intention to leave the European Union (EU), is a very good example of how inter-
group relations – between Britain and the EU, between Britain and other European 
countries - can significantly impact on different social issues, such as migration 
movements, the economy and eventually on the deployment of RET and associated 
initiatives to tackle climate change, both in the UK and in the European Union as a 
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whole (Hepburn & Teytelboym, 2017). Meyer-Ohlendorf & Görlach (2016) identify 
two potential implications of the crisis of the EU – as materialized with Brexit – for 
climate and energy policies. First, countries might perceive that they are better off 
tackling climate change problems in isolation, which can have immediate 
consequences for issues such as fostering renewable energy generation as this is a 
challenge that arguably requires coordinated, multilateral response. Second, climate 
and energy policies may be side-lined by other issues, namely migration and 
‘terrorism’, which are seen by citizens as more pressing (p. 3-4).  
Brexit and other similar events, such as Donald Trump’s US presidency, 
illustrate that the EU and other international agreements for promoting cooperation 
over the protection of human, ecological and other rights1 (Ishay, 2008; also Olwig, 
2007) may be seen as imposing rules, policies and ways of living that threaten 
national and local identities (Zavala, Guerra & Simão, 2017; Batel et al., 2015), in 
both utilitarian and symbolic ways. As Krouwel & Abts (2007) propose, attitudes 
towards European integration are mostly shaped by three dimensions – a utilitarian 
one, which focuses on socio-economic impacts of being integrated in the EU; an 
identity dimension, which accounts for feelings of cultural and economic threat (or its 
contrary) mainly from migrants; and a trust dimension, regarding both national and 
European-level authorities and in how democratic they are/serve the best interests of 
‘the people’ (see also Stegemann and Ossewaarde in this special issue [Stegemman & 
Ossewaarde, 2018]). In the particular case of the UK, several authors highlight how in 
the years leading to Brexit these three dimensions were strongly interwoven in the 
right-wing populist discourses of parties like UKIP in order to reinforce 
Euroscepticism (Vines, 2014; Gifford, 2015).  
Political rhetoric such as that of UKIP2 (UKIP, 2015), challenges established 
policy priorities, such as meeting EU targets for increasing the production of 
renewable energy. This is performed both by employing discourses relying on climate 
change skepticism and by incentivizing the erasing of conflicts over renewable energy 																																																								1	However it is also relevant to acknowledge that there are several limitations and hurdles to overcome 
with EU’s policies on the deployment of RET, which have many shadows of neoliberal capitalist 
business as usual (Barry & Ellis, 2011; Nadai & Labussiére, 2017; Batel, 2017), based on colonialist 
practices (Walker, 2009; Batel & Devine-Wright, 2017) that accentuate people’s feelings of 
environmental loss and guilt (Letzerman, 2015). 2	An example taken from UKIP’s manifesto 2015: “While our major global competitors – the USA, 
China, India – are switching to low-cost fossil fuels, we are forced to close perfectly good coal-fired 
power stations to meet unattainable targets for renewable capacity. If we carry on like this, the lights 
are likely out” (p.39).	
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generation by simply continuing with (fossil-fuel) business as usual (see 
Swyngedouw, 2010 for a discussion; see also Fraune and Knodt in this special issue 
[Fraune & Knodt, 2018]). In other words, a right-wing populist post-truth logic is 
used: right-wing populist because it claims to talk for the people and against the 
system while pushing forward for agendas such as anti-immigration ones; and post-
truth because that is performed by appealing to the public’s concerns and fears – such 
as the ‘destruction of the British countryside’ by migrants and wind farms alike -, 
while neglecting scientific evidence and facts – such as that climate change is 
happening due to anthropogenic causes (IPCC, 2013).  
This type of populist rethoric has already been identified in anti-wind energy 
voices, who present themselves as defending democracy from “non-elected, non-local 
corporate and bureaucratic elites and special business and environmental interest 
groups” (Barry, Ellis & Robinson, 2008, p. 78). And in fact, in the UK, opposition to 
large-scale renewable energy generation technologies has been shown to be mainly 
related with national and European level decision-making processes that are perceived 
to be too centralised and opaque (Bridge et al., 2013; Devine-Wright, 2005; see also 
Stegemann and Ossewaarde in this special issue [Stegemman & Ossewaarde, 2018])), 
as well as with the feeling of identity threat to Britishness – or Englishness –, as 
emplaced in the green rolling hills of the British countryside (Batel et al., 2015)3.  
In other words, attitudes and beliefs about RET-related policies and 
regulations seem to accompany political and institutional changes that are often the 
precursor to and/or the outcome of specific ideological climates and associated inter-
group relations and socio-psychological processes (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2017; 
Roccato, Mannarini & Pacilli, 2017), such as in the current context in Britain. In sum, 
new European energy policies have been aiming to reform, rescale and reterritorialize 
energy systems towards a supposedly sustainable and unified energy transition across 
European states. At the same time, political or governance institutions such as the 
European Union are being strongly contested by some political parties, publics and 
other institutions (see also Stegemann and Ossewaarde in this special issue 
[Stegemann & Ossewaarde, 2018]). This is an important time to explore if and how 
these socio-political events and associated socio-psychological processes are having 																																																								3	This is not to suggest that supporting RET is always contrary to populist-nationalist perspectives – in 
fact, and because RET can be seen as fostering national energy security and as more environmentally 
safe and sustainable, they can also be supported based on a populist-nationalist rationale (e.g., Barone, 
2018).		
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consequences for people’s senses of identity at national and European levels and, 
through that, for people’s beliefs about the ‘Energy Union’ and related energy issues 
at national and European levels.  
This is a relevant time to ask questions that have been so far neglected by 
social sciences’ energy research agenda, such as: 
● What might be the impact of socio-political events such as Brexit on people’s 
beliefs about energy issues and the deployment of RET – e.g., with large-scale 
wind farms built locally following European directives, with grid 
interconnectors between EU member-states, with energy being imported from 
other European countries to avoid blackouts (Office for National Statistics, 
2016)? 	
● Are those impacts preceded and accompanied by inter-group processes such as 
changes in people’s feelings of belongingness to Britain and Europe over the 
period of time leading to Brexit? 	
● Do right-wing populist-nationalist4 discourses and related political rhetoric 
influence or change discourses about energy transformation processes and 
their scale and territoriality? 	
● Do those discourses and potential related changes in group identities go in 
tandem with supporting an ‘energy Brexit’ as well as a political one? 	
 
Next, we will further discuss and present some exploratory data collected with 
representative samples of UK residents with a view to illustrate why it may be 
relevant for future research on energy and social science to  focus on these questions.  
 
2. Different-level identities and energy beliefs: An empirical exploration and 
discussion 
 One important question to ask is whether there was a change in UK residents’ 
feelings of belonging to Europe and to Britain in the years leading up to Brexit, going 
through the 2008 economic crisis and the 2010 start of the ‘refugee crisis’, which 
might indicate an effect of the rise of right-wing populist-nationalism political 
rhetoric (see also Zavala, Guerra & Simão, 2017). Here, we explore this through data 																																																								4 Right-wing nationalism is used in this context to refer to the belief in the distinctive identity and often 
superiority of one nation compared with other nations and the defense of associated beliefs and policies 
in order to protect that nation’s supposed identity (Gifford, 2015).		
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we have collected at two points in time, 2007 and 2012, through large-scale surveys 
completed by representative samples of UK adults5. We asked participants how 
important were British and European identities in describing who they are (see the 
Annex for a full description of the measures used and statistical analyses performed) 
and from there we considered four types of relational identity constellations, namely 
not feeling very British or very European (identified as ‘Low’), feeling both very 
European and very British (identified as ‘High’), feeling more British than European 
(identified as ‘Brit>Euro’), and, inversely, feeling more European than British 
(identified as ‘Euro>Brit’)6 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Comparing British*European identity constellations in 2007 and 2012 
(Surveys 1 and 2) 
 
 
Also supported by Eurobarometer data from 2006 to 20167, across this period, 
the percentage of people feeling more British than European increased substantially 
from 2007 to 2012. In addition, the percentage of those that felt equally British and 																																																								5 Survey 1 was administered in 2007 to a sample of N=1041 UK residents (for more information see 
Devine-Wright, Devine-Wright & Sherry-Brennan, 2010) and Survey 2 was administered in 2012 to a 
sample of N=1519 UK residents (for more information see Aas et al., 2014). The surveys were 
conducted online by a market research company with samples that are representative of all UK adults 
(aged 18+) by age, gender, and social-grade, living in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The surveys included slightly different questions/measures (More information about the surveys and 
the measures that composed them can be found in Annex 1). 6 These groups were calculated by considering Low <=2; High =>4; Brit>Euro when feeling British is 
higher than feeling European and Euro>Brit the other way around – for more information on this 
procedure see Devine-Wright & Batel, 2017.	7	Data under the question “Please tell me how attached you feel to...(UK) (EUROPE)”. 
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European decreased from 2007 to 2012, suggesting that these might be the individuals 
that started to feel more British than European across this period. But what relation 
might these changes have with UK residents’ beliefs and practices regarding energy 
and specifically the deployment of RET? Let us now take a look at the results from 
the Eurobarometer regarding questions about whether UK respondents think that 
decisions about energy policy and decisions about the protection of the environment 
should be made by the UK government or jointly with the EU (Figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figures 2 and 3 – Results of responses to the item “Do you think that decisions about 
(ENERGY POLICY)(PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT), should be made 
by the UK government or jointly with the EU?”, of the Eurobarometer8 
Energy Policy Protection of the environment 
  
 
From 2007 to 2010/11 there was an increase in the percentage of UK 
respondents who believed that decisions about energy policy and the protection of the 
environment should be made by the UK government only – and a decrease of those 
thinking that decisions about these issues should be made together with the EU, 
especially regarding the protection of the environment. Despite the differences being 
marginal (especially regarding beliefs about energy policy), this trend seems to 																																																								8 For all the Eurobarometer data shown in this paper: scales included a ‘Don’t know’ option and data is 
shown for different years and different response categories as available and presented in the 
Eurobarometer; and margins of error were of ±1.9 points for 10% or 90%; ± 2.5 points for 20% or 
80%; ±2.7 points for 30% or 70%; ±3 points for 40% or 60%; and ±3.1 points for 50€. 
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accompany the trend of people tending to feel more British and less European across 
those years. This is not too surprising, as the years in the UK leading to Brexit have 
witnessed a rise in right-wing populist-nationalist political discourses that have put 
side by side the need to defend Britain and the unique British countryside from 
migrants and wind farms alike (see Batel & Devine-Wright, 2017; also Mahendran et 
al., 2014). In turn, research examining political discourses over energy projects in 
their relation with other countries/groups in other socio-geographical contexts 
(Fischendler, Boymel & Boykoff, 2014; Fischendler & Nathan, 2014), also indicate 
that intergroup relations impact beliefs about energy issues, at least at the polity level. 
Batel & Devine-Wright (2017) showed that one of the main factors associated with 
the opposition of community members in Wales (UK) to new high voltage power 
lines was the lack of distributive justice, with costs supported by Wales and benefits 
to be given to England, after a past (and present – see Ellis et al., 2013) history of 
England ‘raiding and milking’ Wales (see also Robinson & Gardner, 2006). This 
work therefore suggests how energy policies and their materialization might create 
and reinforce intergroup tensions and specific dynamics, which, in turn, are related 
with particular socio-historical and political events and processes. It also highlights 
that the intergroup relations and dynamics between different local communities, 
different regions and/or different countries are important to examine and understand 
as a barrier and/or a facilitator of the deployment of RET within and beyond national 
boundaries.  
Research on energy transitions has been highlighted as disregarding the role 
played by people’s place/social identities or place attachments - beyond the local level 
- on their beliefs about RET and other measures to tackle climate change (Devine-
Wright, 2013; Devine-Wright, Price & Leviston, 2015; Devine-Wright & Batel, 
2017). This line of research has emphasized how it is often actually place attachments 
or social identities at more global levels – rather than at a local or national level – that 
are most related with people’s willingness to tackle climate change and to endorse 
associated measures such as the deployment of RET. For example, Devine-Wright 
and colleagues (2015), in a study conducted with a representative sample of 
Australian citizens, illustrated the relevance of the relation between national and 
global place attachments, with individuals expressing stronger global than national 
attachments more likely to attribute climate change to anthropogenic causes, and to 
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oppose hierarchy-enhancing myths that legitimize climate inaction, in comparison to 
individuals indicating stronger national over global place attachments.  
Let us therefore now look precisely at how UK residents’ different-level 
identities directly relate with different energy beliefs. The data presented refers 
mainly to beliefs regarding high-voltage power lines, which have been deployed to 
integrate renewable energy infrastructures into the grid, both within and between 
European countries (European Commission, 2017). Despite UK interconnectors with 
Europe involving subsea cables, this is still often the target of concern by local 
communities and NGOs, in tandem with the impacts of related infrastructures such as 
substations and overhead grid strengthening. As suggested before, the symbolic 
dimension of identities and intergroup-relations – such as ‘giving away electricity to 
Europe’ – can be an important component of people’s responses to, and acceptance 
of, energy infrastructures (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2017)9. Table 1 presents survey 
data on the neglected topic of UK public support for a pan-European integrated 
electricity network. The data suggests that, in 2007, the more people felt Scottish, 
Northern Irish, Irish, or European, the more they supported the construction of a 
European SuperGrid (described in the survey as ‘a system that would interconnect the 
national grid networks of different European states’, and consistent with the Energy 
Union policy aim already described above). Results show significant associations, 
although correlations are not very strong, especially taking into account the large 
sample size. By contrast, feeling British, English or Welsh does not seem to relate in 
any way to supporting a European SuperGrid.  
 
Table 1 – Results from questions about people’s beliefs about energy and the 
environment – 2007 (our data – N=1041) 
  Welsh English Scottish Norther
n Irish 
Irish Britis
h 
European 
Support for a 
European 
SuperGrid 
.103 -.042 .143*10 .153* .153* .043 .077* 
Which 
THREE 
of the 
following, 
Avoid 
blacko
uts 
under 
ns. Yes= 6.18 
No= 5.85 
p<.05 
Yes=3.73 
No=4.93 
p<.05 
Yes=3.03 
No=4.08 
p.05 
ns. ns. Yes=3.06 
No=3.71 
p<.05 																																																								9	There are currently eleven interconnectors planned between the UK and other European countries, 
and while there have not yet been direct impacts from Brexit on these projects, the UK’s position as 
part of the EU internal energy market will be negotiated in the next months (Bosch, 2017; Moffat, 
2017).	10 *=p<.05; **=p>-.001 . 
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if any, do 
you think 
are the 
most 
important 
priorities 
of a 
national 
energy 
policy? 
any 
circum
stances 
Ensure 
the 
UK’s 
energy 
indepe
ndence 
ns. Yes=6.17 
No=5.77 
P<.001 
ns. ns. ns. ns. Yes=.3.38 
No=3.74 
p<.05 
 
One important first note regarding Table 1 is that the similar results for the 
British and English identities echo previous research showing that Britishness is still 
mainly associated with Englishness (Batel et al., 2015; Vines, 2014; Neal & 
Agyeman, 2006; Johnson, 2002). Another important note goes for the fact that the 
more participants feel English, the more they are likely to say that ‘ensuring the UK’s 
energy independence’ and ‘avoiding blackouts under any circumstances’ are one of 
the three important priorities for national energy policy. Inversely, those with stronger 
European identities seem to feel that UK energy independence is less important as a 
policy goal. This reinforces the idea that social identities do play a role in energy 
beliefs and thus that the rise of right-wing populism might give way to more 
closeness, competitiveness and conservatism, namely in British energy policies, 
through more salient national identities (see also Meyer-Ohlendorf & Görlach, 2017). 
It also highlights how such identity dynamics might easily accommodate apparently 
contradictory beliefs, such as wanting to ensure UK’s energy independence but at the 
same time wanting to avoid blackouts – even if interconnection reduces the risks of 
blackouts (Bosch, 2017).  
Let us now discuss the findings for 2012 (see Table 2). We can see that the 
same pattern is found, albeit more markedly: feeling one belongs to Britain does not 
relate with beliefs about the construction of a European-wide grid, whereas feeling 
that one belongs to Europe or to the whole Earth are significantly and positively 
correlated with supporting the construction of a pan-European grid network.  
 
Table 2 – Results from questions about people’s beliefs about energy and the 
environment – 2012 (our data – N=1519) 
2012 Neighbour-
hood 
belonging 
Regional 
belonging 
Britain 
belonging 
Europe 
belonging 
Earth 
belonging 
I support the construction of 
an European-wide SuperGrid ns. ns. ns. .401** .105** 
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Reduce personal electricity 
use to avoid constructing new 
power lines .084** .086** .088** ns. .085** 
A more climate friendly 
system is not dependent on 
more powerlines .072* ns. ns. ns. .131** 
 
It is the participants who indicated feeling they belong more to the 
neighborhood and those feeling they belong more to the whole Earth that believe that 
a more climate friendly system is not dependent on constructing more powerlines. It 
is also interesting to note in Table 2 that those feeling they belong more to the 
neighborhood, the region, Britain and/or the Earth, are also more willing to reduce 
their personal electricity consumption in order to avoid constructing new power lines. 
This might be seen as slightly at odds with the results for 2007 in which those feeling 
more English were willing to accept ‘everything’ to avoid blackouts and ensure the 
UK’s independence. This seems to suggest changes in energy beliefs which 
accompany changes in belongingness to different groups, with the timeframe and 
socio-political events leading to Brexit accentuating the rejection of European level 
policies. These changes might be seen to be associated with an increase in the 
deployment of power lines and other large-scale RET and, we might speculate, 
eventually a more widespread belief in ensuring the UK’s energy security through 
other means – either in the sources of energy production (e.g., nuclear; shale gas), or 
in the ways in which renewables are deployed (e.g., more decentralized).  
 
4. Discussion  
The data presented and explored here are obviously not sufficient to generate 
firm conclusions and evidence. Nevertheless, they do begin to shed light on our 
discussion and on answers to the questions we posed previously. These refer to how 
energy policies and their materialization might create and reinforce intergroup 
tensions and specific dynamics, and points to future research directions that are 
important to follow up in examining people’s relations with energy and specifically 
the social acceptance of RET (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007; Dermont et al., 2017). These 
directions include the following: 
i.) To date, research on the social acceptance of RET has tended to be mainly 
cross-sectional, either focusing on single country case studies (e.g., Devine-Wright & 
Howes, 2010; Cowell, 2010; Firestone & Kempton, 2007) or comparing several 
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countries (e.g., Stedman et al., 2016; Karimi, Toikka & Hukkinen, 2016; Aas et al., 
2014; Toke et al., 2008), at a certain point in time. Research on energy transitions has 
not frequently adopted a socio-historical perspective that examines if and why 
perceptions about energy transitions change and evolve over time11 (but see Malone et 
al., 2017; Sovacool & Brossman, 2014; and Batel, 2017 for a critique) and, namely, 
the impact of particular socio-political and economic events on those. However, the 
present discussion suggests that taking time into account, materialized through socio-
economic and political events and feeding into the history of groups, should more 
often be the focus of research in this area, as it will shed light in what might be the 
impact of socio-political events - such as Brexit - and related intergroup and identity 
processes, on people’s beliefs about energy transitions and unions. A socio-
psychological perspective can be particularly relevant by shedding light on the 
symbolic and identity processes shaping people’s beliefs about energy infrastructures 
across time (see also Batel et al., 2015; Bailey, Devine-Wright & Batel, 2016). A 
good example is Malone et al.’s (2017) research that asked how national narratives 
and related identities shape the acceptance of RET and related beliefs in three 
different countries – Brazil, the USA and Sweden. They illustrate how the relative 
success of different types of energy generation in each of those countries depended on 
the socio-cultural background of each country at the time. In other words, how certain 
national narratives and stories that were most prevalent and with high importance in 
shaping national pride and identity at a certain moment in time hindered or facilitated 
the successful development of energy sources such as nuclear, sugar cane ethanol and 
biomass energy, in the USA, Brazil and Sweden respectively, during the 20th century. 
As the authors emphasize “as nations change their demographic makeup, type of 
society (e.g., rural to urban), degree of involvement with other nations (e.g., 
“globalization”), national narratives, can be changed, forgotten or added to” (p.71); 
ii.) In multi-scalar governance systems (Swyngedouw, 2010), inter-group 
relations and associated identities and processes at different levels, have an impact on 
energy transitions. So far the majority of the literature on the social acceptance of 
RET has focused on the relationship between developers and policy-makers, and local 
community members, as the main inter-group conflict to understand and ‘solve’ in 																																																								11 Not including analyses based on a socio-technical transitions perspective (e.g.; Verbong & Geels, 
2007; also Bridge et al., 2013), but which do not tend to account for socio-political identities as 
discussed here.  
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RET siting. But the relationship between different-level identities and different energy 
transitions scenarios should be further explored. What is the relation between these 
different-level identities and the endorsement for other alternatives to renewable 
energy, such as nuclear power and shale gas? And what can they tell us about 
people’s willingness to embrace other modes of energy system organization, such as 
more decentralized energy systems at household and community levels?  
iii.) Finally, the most important suggestion might be to analyze the two aspects 
above together or to adopt a more relational approach in research on the social 
acceptance of RET. This could be aware of which energy policies are being enforced 
and at what level, but also of the other socioeconomic and political events that are 
shaping and impacting people’s lives and how those might impact on energy 
transitions over time (see also Batel, 2017). The rise of right-wing populism and post-
truth politics might, by increasing nationalist, sovereignty, independentist and non-
evidence based beliefs, foster higher support for independent and competitive energy 
policies at the European and international level. These policies will eventually be 
mainly focused on guaranteeing security of supply and higher standards of living at 
the national level at the expense of further promoting renewable energy generation 
and of other groups (Meyer-Ohlendorf & Görlach, 2016). It is therefore crucial that 
future research focuses on examining if and how right-wing populist nationalist 
discourses influence energy transformation processes and specifically their scale and 
territoriality. Additionally, this discussion suggests that, also regarding energy 
transitions, a European counter-populism might be needed (Gavalli et al 2017, p. 11) 
– or a left-wing one. In fact, the analyses suggest that the relationship between right-
wing populism and responses to renewable energy projects, under discussion in this 
special issue, is a complex one (see also Fraune and Knodt in this special issue 
[Fraune & Knodt, 2018]) – whereas some of the discourses opposing renewable 
energy projects reflect and might strengthen right-wing populist movements and 
parties (see Batel et al., 2015); others are a needed resistance to current post-political 
systems while exposing the conflictive character of the deployment of RET (see Barry 
& Ellis, 2011; also Batel, 2017; Mouffe, 2013). This resistance is crucial for 
discussing alternative ways of performing sustainable energy transitions (see also 
MacArthur and Matthewman in this special issue [MacArthur & Matthewman, 
2018]).  
	15 	
To conclude, this is a preliminary and exploratory empirical analysis of these 
issues. Future research should address the aspects mentioned above and, at a 
methodological level, use qualitative methods (e.g. focus groups); and, when using 
surveys, use instruments with exactly the same wording. At a conceptual level, an 
aspect worthy of further consideration might be to examine the role of social identities 
in shaping beliefs about energy issues. The majority of the energy research and social 
science literature has been dominated by the analysis of the role of (local) place 
attachments in responses to RET, but to move the conceptual focus to encompass 
place and social identities together might foster the development of research in other 
fruitful directions. The analyses presented here illustrate that intergroup relations and 
dynamics at different scales are important to examine and understand as a barrier 
and/or a facilitator of the deployment of RET within and beyond national boundaries.  
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ANNEX 
Measures included in the surveys: 
● Survey 1: 	
o Sense of belongingness [How important are the following in 
describing who you are? English/Scottish /Welsh / Northern Irish 
/Irish / British / European – scale of 1=Extremely unimportant to 
7=Extremely important]; 	
o Beliefs about the most important priorities of a national energy policy 
[Please select up to 3 responses: Avoid blackouts under any 
circumstances; Ensure the UK’s energy independence; Address global 
warming; Change people’s energy use behavior; Increase the use of 
renewable energy sources (wind, solar)]; 	
o Belief about a European wide grid [How much do you support or 
oppose the construction of a Europe-wide electricity network? 
1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly support]. 	
● Survey 2: 	
o Sense of belongingness [To what extent do you feel a weak or a strong 
sense of belonging to the following areas? The neighborhood where 
you live/Britain/Europe/the Earth ~ whole world; scale from 1=No 
sense of belonging to 5=Very strong sense of belonging];	
o Beliefs about energy issues [How far do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? I am willing to reduce my use of electricity if 
this reduces the need for new high voltage powerlines/ I think we 
should move from centralised energy (large power stations and high-
voltage lines) to decentralised energy (local power supply and small 
scale solar panels and wind turbines)/ I support the construction of a 
European-wide SuperGrid that connects the systems of Europe 
together/ I support the further development and construction of power 
lines; To what extent would you support the building of a new high 
voltage overhead powerline in the area near to where you live (i.e. 
within 3 miles)?/ To what extent would you accept the construction of 
a new high-voltage power line near your community (for example, 
within 3 miles)?/ with a scale from 1=Strongly or not at all 
disagree/accept/support to 5=Strongly agree/accept/support].	
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The data presented was based on the following statistical analyses: 
● Figure 1: For the different identity groups (i.e., Low, High, Brit>Euro, 
Euro>Brit) categorical variables were devised. The ‘Low’ subgroup consisted 
of those with both low attachment (scoring 1 to 3 in Survey 1; scoring 1 or 2 
in Survey 2) to Europe and to Britain; the ‘High’ subgroup consisted of those 
with both high attachment (scoring 5 to 7 in Survey1; scoring 4 or 5 in 
Survey2) to Europe and to Britain; the ‘Brit>Euro’ subgroup consisted of 
those with comparatively stronger national attachment in comparison to 
European levels, and inversely, the ‘Euro>Brit’ subgroup consisted of those 
with comparatively stronger European attachment in comparison with national 
attachment.	
● Table 1: Results for responses to “Belief about an European SuperGrid”  and 
its relation with different-level-identities were the outcome of correlational 
analyses. Results for responses to the question on “Beliefs about the most 
important priorities of a national energy policy” and its interaction with 
different level identities were calculated based on a chi-square analysis.	
● Table 2: Results for responses to “Belief about energy issues” and their 
relation with different-level-identities were the outcome of correlational 
analyses. 	
 
 
